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1 INTRODUCTION
Insufficient information to predict famine was
widely seen to be a central reason for the failure of
national governments and the international donor
community to prevent famines in Africa in the mid
1980s. Since then, there have been substantial im-
provements in the development of purpose-built
information systems to predict famine. Many new
famine early warning systems (EWS) have been set
up, but the goal of famine prevention remains
elusive. At least in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, the
information now provided is not being used
adequately to trigger timely and appropriate re-
sponse. These EWS have tended to be evaluated
internally, for the validity and timeliness of the
information they produce with little account taken of
what happens to the information once it enters the
decision-making process. It is only by situating EWS
in the wider political and institutional context within
which they operate, that obstacles to the effective
exploitation of the information to trigger response
can be addressed.
This article summarizes the results of research into
how early warning (EW) information is used in
relief response planning in five African countries
(Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali and Turkana District
in Kenya). The research sought to investigate why
more information has not always led to better
response. Results indicate that famines are not nec-
essarily hard to predict. The challenge is how to
prevent them; information tends to play only a
peripheral role in the process of famine response.
The central policy challenge is no longer to
develop ever more sophisticated indicators, nor
information systems capable of tracking and analys-
ing them. To realize the benefits of EWS, constraints
on the response side of the equation must be tackled.
The main findings of this analysis of the use of EW
information are:
that better generation and use of information do
not automatically lead to greater use of the knowl-
edge thus gained;
that the transition from provision of information
to the use of knowledge is especially complex when
A
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multiple actors are involved in information genera-
tion and in decision-making, and when the decisions
involve high profile famine relief activities;
that the process of negotiation between the main
actors and the terms and conditions under which this
takes place are central determinants of whether and
how knowledge is used;
that inappropriate, often centralized, bureaucratic
structures can block knowledge flows, or render
them irrelevant;
that the political value of information (in turn
determined by the political environment) far out-
weighs its accuracy, timeliness, relevance or accessi-
bility when assessing why or whether it is used;
that the coincidence of war and famine in much of
Africa raises the political stakes of famine EW infor-
mation and its use even higher;
that the economic value ofinformation (for exam-
ple, intervening early and thereby reducing the high
cost to donors and government of late response to
famine) has been inadequately documented, but is
also very difficult to calculate accurately.
In many respects, EWS are caricatures of how infor-
mation and knowledge are - or are not - used in
development planning. The necessarily incomplete
information provided, pressure for timely use of
information and the inevitable conflicts of interests
over allocation of famine relief and its high profile all
conspire to make this case an especially problematic
one. But precisely because famine prevention is so
inextricably bound up with the use or misuse of
information, the case offers insights into other, less
clear-cut cases of information use to trigger public
action.
2 BACKGROUND
The study period (May/June 1990 to November!
December 1991), was a year of drought across
much of the Sahel and Horn of Africa, with early
indications that food crises would be widespread.
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Table 1: Characte,istics of case study countries in 1990/91
CHARACTERISTICS ETHIOPIA SUDAN CHAD MALI TURKANA,
KENYA
Level of development
of EWS
medium
to high
low medium high high
Centralized!
decentralized EW and
response system
centralized centralized centralized centralized decentralized
Donor/government
relations
poor, until
coup in
1991
poor good good good
International profile
of famine prevention
activities
high
profile
high
profile
low
profile
low
profile
medium
profile
lnsecurlty/confHct
affecting food
security
yes (civil
war, coup)
yes (civil
war)
yes
(coup,
limited)
yes (coup,
limited)
yes (livestock
raiding)
Many EWS were being tested for the first time. The
five countries studied were chosen to reflect
differing EWS and predictive capacities; political
and cultural environments; institutional arrange-
ments for response; and national positions of
influence or impotence vis à vis western donor
countries. Table 1 summarizes the principal differ-
ences between the five countries. Four of the main
donors of humanitarian relief to Africa were also
included in the study: the World Food Programme
(WFP), the European Community (EC), the United
States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Overseas Development Admin-
istration of the UK (ODA).
The analysis of how EW information is used
concentrates on the EWS themselves, and on two
groups of decision-makers: governments and do-
nors, the key players in relief response planning
and negotiations. It is they who control resources
and who exercise power, particularly the interna-
tional donor community which provides most of
the emergency relief to the Sahel and Horn of
Africa. (Indeed, it should be noted that donors
have played a major role in providing funding and
technical support to many EWS, including those in
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
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Chad, Mali and Turkana). Potential beneficiaries
of timely response - famine-prone people them-
selves - should be crucial actors in the formal
EW/response process. Their 'interests' are, how-
ever, usually negotiated over from a distance.
Although they have their own well-developed
information and response mechanisms, there is a
wide gulf between them and the formal EWS
response decision-making. This article focuses on
the formal systems.
The main characteristics of EW and decision-making
in each of the five countries studied are summarized
in Table 2. The nature of the decision-making process
is a reflection of the political context within which it
is operating. Thus, where donor/government rela-
tions were strained, as in Sudan and Ethiopia, there
was little transparency in decision-making, and do-
nor agencies set up parallel structures to govern-
ment. In Mali, in contrast, where donor! government
co-ordination over EW and response was rooted in
long-standing collaboration over cereal market liber-
alization, negotiation over response took place in a
comparatively cooperative and well-planned con-
text. The analysis presented here incorporates, rather
than ignores, political influences.
Table 2: Characteristics of early warning systems and decision-making in
five countries in 1990/91
CHARACTERISTICS ETHIOPIA SUDAN CHAD MALI TURKANA,
KEN VA
1 Availability of
EW information
(a) nationally/
in-country
(b) internationally
medium
medium
low
medium
high
high
high
high
high
high
2 Significance of
Informal information
channels
high high medium low low
3 SignIficance of
dlsaster tourlsm
medium high medium low low
4 Predictive capabilities
of EWS
medium medium medium medium medium
5 Single vs. multiple
indicator use:
(a) in EWS
(b) in decision-making
multiple
single
multiple
single
multiple
single
multiple
single
multiple
single
6 Transparency of
decision-making
no no yes yes yes
7 Paralletdonordeclsion-
making system to
governmi system
yes yes no no no
8 Existence of
programmed response
optiöfla
no no no yes yes
9 Gearedto free foOd
aid dlètributtôn response
yes yes yes yes no
The research investigated information use within
multiple bureaucracies with very different character-
istics and working to a range of political agendas
which aré themselves changing. This article analyses
some of the key triggers and barriers to information
use, especially those encountered during the year of
investigation - 1990/91. However, it should be noted
that relationships between providers of information
and individual administrators are built up over time,
and there is inevitably a degree of instability and
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unpredictability. Most of the bureaucracies in ques-
tion are well-developed and do have a degree of
flexibility within the constraints we describe.
3 WHAT ARE FAMINE EARLY WARNING
SYSTEMS?
Famine EWS can be defined as systems of data collec-
tion to monitor people's access to food in order to
provide timely notice when a food crisis threatens
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
and thus to elicit response (Davies et al. 1991: 6). The
first major drive to establish EWS in Africa occurred
after the 1972/73 famine in the Sahel, which the
international community failed to recognize in time.
As a result, EWS were set up to service existing donor
and UN food aid institutions and to mobilize the
international food aid system; this has remained
their raison d'être ever since. The second era of famine
early warning in Africa, marked by even greater
investment in EWS, occurred after the severe famines
of the mid-1980s, when lack of information was often
blamed for the lack of timely response. However,
despite some significant advances in technology and
a far greater understanding of the dynamics of food
crisis, there have been few changes in either the
underlying assumptions on which EWS are built, or
the structural relationships between donors and re-
cipients of food aid - between resource-rich and
resource-poor states.
During the 1980s, there has been a paradigm shift in
the theory and understanding of famine, at least
amongst 'outsiders'. Narrow definitions of famine,
based on increases in mortality have been broadened
to take account of the social and economic collapse
within acutely food insecure communities. By the
1990s, famine in Africa falls into two broad catego-
ries: famine triggered by drought; and famine
triggered by war and its impact on local populations,
sometimes in conjunction with drought. The hardest
to predict - and also the most severe - are those
founded on the troika of war, drought and underly-
ing impoverishment. Famines linked to conflict have
specific EW needs, including indicators of political
and military activity, on which little progress has
been made so far. Their consideration is beyond the
scope of this short article.
Most progress has been made with regard to drought-
related EW. Design of EWS in this context has
evolved as our understanding of the causes of food
insecurity has advanced from a preoccupation with
food supply to recognition of factors associated with
access or entitlement to food. Thus, a minimalist
approach to EW, using the single-indicator national
food balance sheet as a proxy for food security status,
has shifted towards a more multi-dimensional,
maximalist approach using socio-economic indica-
tors to provide information about access to, as well as
availability of, food. Other developments include
advances in measuring the vulnerability of different
population groups to food crisis or famine, and moni-
toring people's coping strategies in the face of drought
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
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as indicators of how seriously they are affected and of
their options to alleviate its consequences.
The shift away from a minimalist approach to EW is
to be welcomed. Where famines are not linked to
endemic conflict (e.g. in the Sahel and much of south-
ern Africa), minimalist EWS risk being redundant for
much of the time, capable only of detecting major
collapses of food economies, which occur perhaps
once every ten years. On the other hand, the
maximalist school argues that famine prediction will
only ever be sustainable - or, indeed, of any real use
- if it is incorporated into wider information systems
which can serve multiple planning needs.
While ever more sophisticated EWS are developed in
Africa, some authors argue that the problem needs to
be approached via a much broader democratization
of information flows within society as a whole. Draw-
ing especially on the experience of India, the most
effective EWS is thus held to be a free press (Drèze
and Sen 1989). This is certainly important, but the
role of the media as a form of early warning should
not be exaggerated. Since 1984/85, when the western
media exposed the famine in Ethiopia, donors have
been more reluctant to ignore the potential threat of
media coverage in their own countries. But only full-
blown famines are newsworthy, when the visual
images are guaranteed to shock and the crisis is
sufficiently large scale to make international news.
Thus the media can be most effective at triggering
response when it is already too late.
In 1991 there was some coverage in the western
media of the food crisis in North Sudan, focusing
especially on the fraught political negotiations which
surrounded the relief operation. Putting western and
Sudanese politicians on the spot, in radio and televi-
sion interviews, exerted some pressure to speed up
the delayed relief operation, but not until well into
1991, when the Gulf War no longer dominated the
media - too late for food relief to arrive in Sudan in
time.
4 RESPONSE
Response to prevent famine can be defined as addi-
tional resources (over and above normal develop-
mental aid, including programme and project food
aid), which are channelled to famine-prone people in
order to assist them in withstanding the effects of
declining access to food. In almost every case, such
response is limited to emergency food aid, usually
distributed as free food rations to vulnerable
populations or sometimes via food-for-work pro-
grammes. Most relief resources for countries ut the
Sahel and Horn of Africa are provided by the interna-
tional donor community. The following two sections
therefore focus on the international humanitarian
relief response.
Most famine relief seeks to save lives. Emergency
food aid is intended to protect the consumption
of people threatened by starvation. The system
is most successful in reaching vulnerable people
who are already far down the famine spiral -
somewhere between destitution and death as
shown on Figure 1 (see next page). Genuinely
timely response would, however, seek to preserve
livelihoods, intervening much earlier in the spiral
at a stage between livelihood insecurity and destitu-
tion, as represented in Figure 1. This rarely happens
in practice.
The results of the research in Sudan, Ethiopia and
Chad in 1990/91 show a very poor record of late
response, and an inherent weakness of emergency
response procedures.
In each case most relief aid reached the country,
let alone the potential beneficiaries in remote
regions, after the hungry season during which
assistance was needed most. In Chad, one of the
worst cases, the time lag between recommenda-
tions for relief being made and international food
aid arriving in country was 12 months. The arrival
of the food coincided with a bumper harvest.
There are few examples of EWS linked to pre-pro-
grammed response options. In the case study coun-
tries, these are limited to the Turkana Drought
Contingency Action Plan at sub-national level
and the Stock National de Sécurité at national level
in Mali. There are obvious advantages to these
systems: above all, they eliminate the time-lag
required to mobilize international relief resources.
The case of Turkana in 1990/91 shows the advan-
tages of choosing the most appropriate response
from a range of possible options. But setting up
a pre-programmed response system is difficult
to achieve. It requires a long-term commitment of
resources on both the donor and government
sides - hence good relations between them - to
maintain both a contingency plan and institutional
preparedness in between periods of need.
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5 BARRIERS TO INFORMATION USE
Prior to the development of EWS in Africa, it was
implicitly assumed that the provision of systematic
EW information could oil the wheels of decision-
making processes and reduce conflicts of interest
between actors involved in food crisis prevention in
an impartial manner. The way in which information
was perceived has been likened to a 'silver bullet',
which could solve problems by itself, irrespective of
the wider institutional, social, economic and political
constraints to intervention (de Kadt 1989: 504). This
is a seductive idea for governments and donors, but
it does not work. The failure of EW to trigger timely
response is testimony to this misconception. As
information has become more widely available, there
is a growing awareness of constraints to information
use which are external to the EWS and over which it
has little control.
Table 3 (see page 75) summarizes the principal barri-
ers to, and triggers for, information use identified in
the five case study countries. A significant number of
these are directly related to the ways in which infor-
mation is used.
The notion of information being used as an 'escape-
hatch' for inaction is a common phenomenon in the
tale of EW. To some extent, the quest for ever more
sophisticated and detailed early warning data is
testimony to this: 'we cannot act until we are sure
who is at risk and why'. This can be a convenient way
of evading action when decisions are tough and the
political climate is not conducive to response.
The following are some of the major barriers to
the use of early warning information, borne out
by the results of the research in the five countries
studied.
Accessibility of information
Much of the thrust towards developing information
systems to predict famine was premised on the
misapprehension that a lack of information was the
principal obstacle to prevention. Attention has there-
fore focused on the technical aspects of prediction.
But poor rural people who are vulnerable to famines
have always had highly developed information sys-
tems to help them to predict and plan for food short-
ages. Such intelligence networks are central to their
survival (Davies 1993). Predicting severe drought-
related food shortage has rarely been a problem of an
absolute lack of information, but rather a question of
who has access to it, who controls it and who owns it.
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
The boom in famine EWS since the mid 1980s
in Africa has improved decision-makers' access to
information which they can understand, although
most of these EWS still do not tap the
indigenous knowledge of famine-prone people,
relying instead on arms' length indicators, such as
market prices, crop assessments and nutritional
measurements.
Figure 1: The downward spiral of famine
TIME
y
LIVELIHOOD
INSECURITY
y
DESTITUTION
4-
DEATH
-
EARLYE- RESPONSE
MOST EWS
TRIGGER
RESPONSE
HERE
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Table 3: Triggers and barriers to response process to EW in 1990/91
TRIGGERS/BARRIERS ETHIOPIA SUDAN CHAD MALI TURKANA,
KENYA
1 EW practitioners involved
In decision-making
no (except
within govt)
no no no yes
2 InternatIonal EW
Information as trigger to
response decision-
making
yes yes yes yes no
3 National EWS information
used for targeting
limited limited limited yes yes
4 Crisis indicators s trigger yes yes yes no no
5 influence of western media yes yes yes no no
6 Transparency of decision-
making
low low high high high
7 Bureaucracy and logistics
of International relief
delivery system as a barrier
yes yes yes no no
8 Logistics of national relief
delivery system as a barrier
yes yes yes no yes
9 Pre-programmed response
options facilitate response
no no no yes yes
10 Flexible response options no no no no yes
11 Donor co-ordination good poor good good not
relevant
12 Donor-government
relations
very poor poor adequate adequate adequate
13 ConflIct as a barrier to
response
yes yes no no no
What is EW information used for?
In theory, EW information is used to inform
decision-making and to trigger a response designed
to prevent famine. In practice, how it is used
depends on the user's agenda. The most common
discrepancies in how EW information is inter-
preted occur between international donors and
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national governments. The former may wish to
minimize the allocation of scarce relief, or be
reluctant to provide it to a government towards
which it is ill-disposed. Meanwhile, it may be in the
interests of an impoverished national government to
maximize food aid receipts which are a valuable
external resource. As a result, the same EW informa-
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
tion may be translated - even manipulated - into very
different assessments of needs by each actor. This
was the case in both Chad and Mali in 1990/91. A
further complicating factor for foreign NGOs is that
they are invariably the preferred agents of donors
for delivering emergency relief. Food aid allocations
may correlate more closely with the geographic area
of operation of an NGO, than with evidence of need
provided by the EWS.
What kind of information triggers response?
On the information generation side, attempts have
been made to adapt methodologies to reflect the
diversity of drought-induced famines. Similar
changes have not been made with respect to the
type of information which is used to trigger
response. Busy decision-makers swamped with
information tend to gravitate towards simple,
straightforward messages - often rather crude
indicators. Those controlling response tend to
remain preoccupied with supply-side factors, with
a narrow emphasis on identifying required levels
of emergency food aid. Thus, at international
donor level, the principal source of EW information
used by senior bureaucrats in their annual bid for
food aid allocations remains the FAO Harvest As-
sessment and the national food balance sheet con-
structed on the basis of it. This occurs despite the
availability of more detailed data from national EWS
which address some of the distributional aspects of
access to food as well. The harvest assessment is
quantitative and tends to be used as if it were not
controversial, despite widespread recognition (not
least by FAO) that the Harvest Assessment is a highly
approximate indicator. Using the Harvest Assess-
ment in this way can lead to information from na-
tional EWS being held in abeyance until the Harvest
Assessment (which tells only part of the story) is
completed and agreed. This was the case in Chad in
1990.
Credibility of information
Information must be seen to be credible by all
negotiating parties involved in the allocation of
scarce resources. Much of the energy devoted to
developing ever more accurate, reliable and timely
indicators to forecast shortfalls in food supply and
access to food, has been directed towards a quest
for (usually quantified) objectivity. Such objectivity
is inevitably tenuous given the difficulties associ-
ated with collecting accurate information in many
famine-prone areas, and the complexity of the cau-
salifies of famine. Indeed, it is rarely an 'objective'
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
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assessment of the accuracy of the data which ulti-
mately determines the credibility it is accorded. Cred-
ibility depends on more specious determinants, such
as:
I) Who 'owns' the information: an information
system which is entirely 'owned' by national
government is less likely to hold sway with interna-
tional donors than one in which they too have a
vested interest. They do not trust it. Instead, they
rely heavily on assessments carried out by the
international donor community, usually by UN
agencies. These assessments possess the critical
requirement of the international stamp of credibil-
ity; hence the emphasis placed on FAO's Harvest
Assessment. The irony is that the information in
these assessments is usually only as good as that
of the national EWS on which they depend for
data. But the international EWS is given the
benefit of the doubt, whereas the national EWS is
not (for example, in Ethiopia under the Mengistu
regime).
ii) Donor/government relations: where relations
are already strained due to political differences,
there is immediately a heightened suspicion and
mistrust on all sides about the interpretation of EW
data, which is implicitly assumed to be politically
biased. This may be complicated by conflicting
assessments carried out by different parties which
hardly communicate with one another. Better
information can only go some way towards
improving credibility, which is as much a function
of wider relations of trust and co-ordination,
as a characteristic of the information itself. The
fundamental paradox of EW information is that
it is least likely to trigger effective response when
it is most needed: when donor! government relations
are poor.
The influence of crisis indicators
Donor decision-making appears to be driven by
downstream not upstream events. The urgency
with which response is treated depends on
indications that a crisis is already underway, thus
losing the benefit of early warning. Evidence of
human stress is most influential as a crisis indicator
(high rates of malnutrition or increased mortality),
even though these are not early indicators, but
signs of the outcome of failure to respond in time.
This is most true in countries where donors are
least well-disposed to helping government, such as
in Ethiopia and Sudan during 1990 and beginning
of 1991. The danger of this scenario is that a
vicious circle is set in motion. If donors only
respond to crises, those trying to trigger donor
response bid up the severity of the situation to
initiate some action. This can backfire, if the exagger-
ated prophecies are not fulfilled. In Sudan, for
example, forecasts of numbers of vulnerable people
were translated into predictions of 'megadeaths' if
agencies failed to provide relief. The relief
operation fell way below target, and the exagger-
ated prophecies did not materialise, so donors felt
they had been misled, which may influence
their willingness to respond next time. Under these
conditions, everyone misses what is really happen-
ing as a result of the failure to provide adequate
relief: a continuous undermining of people's ability
to feed themselves, and increasing vulnerability to
the next drought.
Aggregation of information
Most EW and response systems are highly central-
ized. EW information has to be aggregated to fit
with this bureaucratic structure, thereby losing
whatever understanding of local food economies,
or of local people's coping strategies, the EWS
may have detected. Decisions to respond and the
mobilization of resources are often taking place
hundreds (or even thousands) of miles from where
help is needed, by people who are far removed
from what is happening on the ground, with little
sense of urgency.1 The EW and response system in
Turkana provides an interesting counter-example
of a decentralized system, the potential advantage
of which is that decision-makers are much closer
to the action. They have a much better understand-
ing of what is required and of how quickly
it is needed, especially if livelihoods are to be
preserved, rather than simply people kept alive.
The Turkana system used this advantage in 1990/91
when EW recommendations were translated rapidly
into firm decisions to respond. A deterioration of
environmental indicators alone, before human
welfare indicators deteriorated, was sufficient to
trigger a response2. But a decentralized EW and
decision-making system must be supported by
decentralized access to relief resources if the full
benefits of more timely and appropriate response
are to be realized.
On the other hand, targeting decisions may make greater use of
local knowledge and information.
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Political barriers to information use
The political context is a critical determinant of how
EW information is used. An EWS cannot cut through
antagonistic political relations, and guarantee a timely
response. On the contrary, it becomes a pawn in
political controversy and negotiation. Poor political
relations can undermine or destroy the whole EW/
response process, especially in situations where hu-
manitarian relief is the only available resource due to
the anterior breakdown of donor/government rela-
tions. Sudan in 1990/91 is a classic example. The
Sudanese government was not prepared to admit
the scale of the food crisis nor the need for
intemational relief until well into 1991. Such a
position would have undermined their policy of
food self-sufficiency and increased their depend-
ence on westem food aid donors from whom they
were trying to distance themselves. Meanwhile,
donor agencies were reluctant to provide resources
to a govemment towards which they were ill-
disposed and were suspicious about how relief
resources would be used, or mis-used, if they did
not have complete control over them, a condition
unacceptable to a government which resented being
dictated to by western donors. The result was
stalemate in the response planning process for a
number of months.
Inappropriate bureaucratic procedures
It is in the nature of emergency relief that most
decisions about its allocation cannot be pre-pro-
grammed. Examples of planned response mecha-
nisms are rare and tend to operate in rather
exceptional circumstances (as in Mali, for example,
where EW and response are linked into wider struc-
tural adjustment initiatives). In-built bureaucratic
rigidities militate against effective exploitation of
EW of famine in many donor agencies which are set
up to respond to famine, not to protect insecure
livelihoods. Such rigidities include the timing of
decisions about relief allocations which are over-
reliant on internationally recognized assessments at
the expense of earlier indicators available from na-
tional EWS, and which bear little or no relationship to
the seasonality of the relief needs of the hungry and
food insecure in Africa. Emergency and develop-
ment activities are usually clearly compartmentalized
within donor agencies, even though information
It is noted, however, that theEW and response system did not work
so effectively in Turkana in 1992, when the political climate was less
conducive to timely response. Once again, this underlines the
enormous significance of the political context of a famine prediction
and prevention system.
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may suggest that the distinction is inappropriate.
Obstacles to timely response in donor headquarters
are further exacerbated by planning constraints im-
posed by the financial year rather than the seasonality
of hunger in Africa. Information cannot, by itself,
alter the functioning of bureaucratic structures.
Lack of accountability
Lack of accountability in famine EW is illustrated by
the role EW plays in other sectors, such as intelli-
gence and forecasting systems for financial markets,
or defence strategies for governments. What distin-
guishes these information systems fromfamine EWS
is that the interests of the instigators and the users of
the information generated are directly threatened if
the information is incorrect or not exploited in a
timely manner. In these circumstances, those who
are responsible for EW have a vested interest in
ensuring that the information system fulfils its pre-
scribed function. By way of example, the profitabil-
ity of a financial trading house is contingent upon
market intelligence, of which a significant propor-
tion is the ability to forecast future trends (Davies
et al,1991). This internal accountability does not
operate for famine EW in the Sahel and Horn of
Africa. The potential victims of famine are neither
those who request the setting up of an EWS, nor
is it they who use the information to influence
decisions. Even if they had access to the information,
the capacity and power poor people have to
make preventive choices on the basis of EW is
severely constrained by lack of resources and of
access to decision-makers and political systems. This
is not to underestimate the importance of poor
people's coping strategies employed to mitigate
the threat of famine, but their ability to respond
to signals additional to their own information
networks is finite.
Governments have an indirect interest in preventing
famine, but it is part of a wider political, social and
economic agenda; famine-prone populations may be
even more vulnerable in the absence of accountable
political processes. Failure to react to EW entails
a set of costs and perhaps benefits (e.g. greater
quantities of emergency relief when a late response
eventually occurs), which governments can assess
at arm's length from the direct threat of starvation.
The accountability of international aid donors is
limited to western public opinion, which may act
on behalf of southem famine victims, but this is a
weak and attenuated link and is critically influenced
by the access and interest of the media. The context
ids bulletin vol 25 no 2 1994
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within which famine EWS operate are divorced from
the contexts about which they provide information.
Sustainability
The sustainability of EWS is questionable in several
respects, especially in terms of their cost-effective-
ness, utility and the priority attached to information
systems. A discussion of sustainability and who
pays for the system cannot be divorced from the issue
of 'ownership' and credibility of information. EWS
are generally projects set up with donor funding,
sometimes - but not always - based on existing gov-
ernment structures. This is particularly the case in
the Sahel and Horn of Africa. The implicit assump-
tion is that eventually they will be taken over by
government, but information systems - however use-
ful - are rarely at the top of a resource-poor govern-
ment's agenda. On' the donor side, evaluations of the
effectiveness of EWS are difficult to achieve: they
tend to be limited to the internal mechanisms of the
information system itself and do not address the
response which they succeed or fail in triggering.
Cost-effectiveness is even more troublesome: whereas
direct costs are relatively straightforward to deter-
mine, opportunity costs are much harder to account
for. These would have to be calculated according to
the relative costs of late and timely response. The
effectiveness side of the equation cannot be fully
measured either, given that many of the obstacles to
exploiting information are external to the system.
Calculating the 'economic' value of EW information
in a comprehensive way is uncharted territory,
and highly problematic. However, to talk about
sustain-ability of an EWS only in terms of cost
partly misses the point. Who 'owns' the information
is critical to how it is used, as described above,
and this is a function of who funds the system.
The evidence points to the advantages of a jointly
'owned' EWS, by both donors and government. If
both have a stake in it, both have a vested interest in
using the information.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Developing more comprehensive information sys-
tems cannot improve famine prevention unless the
response side of the equation is also tackled. There
are no easy answers; fundamental improvements on
the response side will inevitably challenge a wide
range of political, financial and institutional relation-
ships between donor and recipient states. The prob-
lem lies in (i) the political implications, in terms
of ownership and control over resources, both within
and between states, and (ii) the economic implica-
fions: recurrent expenditure required to sustain a
national food security system is often very high.
Although it is not difficult to set out criteria for
establishing a more logical and efficient system for
preventing famine, the obstacles tend to be political
and economic rather than mechanical. Timeliness of
the waming is often cited as one of the central obsta-
cies to response, but in fact the more complex and
serious barriers are rooted in the political economy
of information use. The clearest message is that
information - however accurate and timely it is - can
only oil the wheels of the decision-making process.
Predicting famines is a necessary but insufficient pre-
condition for famine prevention. Systematic infor-
mation about the likelthood of famine is by no means
redundant: without EWS the process of resource
allocation is even more fraught with difficulty, as
decision-makers are forced to rely on 'disaster tour-
ism' and other forms of informal assessment, which
are often wrong, late and incomplete. What then are
the policy issues which need to be addressed to
improve the use of information in famine prediction
and prevention?
Early Warning should continue but its remit
should be widened
EWS must be able to predict famines when necessary.
But this objective should not determine everything
that the information system does or is used for.
The remit of an EWS should be extended beyond
famine prediction. Food information systems, which
can be used for a multiplicity of planning tasks,
and are sensitive to the threat of famine through
continuous monitoring, are more appropriate and
useful to the food security planning needs of African
countries.
EWS should be jointly-funded ventures
National and sub-national EWS are most likely to
be used by all parties, and to be sustainable, if
jointly-funded by donors and government, so
both have a stake in the system. This is feasible
where donor-government relations are good. Where
they are not, co-operation over information is less
likely to succeed.
End-of-year harvest assessments should play a
less prominent role
Present decision-making relies too heavily on
harvest assessments carried out at the end of
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the growing season, which results in late response
by the international community. In the absence
of food security reserves in-country, agreed
end-of-year assessments leave little time to
respond to food crisis. A phased response based on
earlier assessment would facilitate timely action.
Information collection and use needs to be
decentralized
A decentralized EWS can take better account of
local variations in the food economy, can be more
sensitive to local coping strategies and vulnerabil-
ity to food stress, and hence can recommend
more appropriate interventions. The management of
EW information is usually less cumbersome if
decentralized. Disadvantages of a decentralized EWS
include problems of standardization of data, of
co-ordination and the risk of providing too much
detail for busy decision makers. In-country decen-
tralization of decision-making means that decision-
makers are closer to what is happening, interpreta-
tion of information is less distorted, and they
usually have a greater sense of urgency to respond
to a problem close at hand. Against this, such
decentralization is impossible in a highly centralized
bureaucracy, and if adequate personnel capacity
does not exist at local level. There is little sense in
decentralising EW and decision-making if control
over resources and the capacity to respond are not
also decentralized.
Sovereignty and accountability
Responsibility for famine prevention is seen to lie
with national governments, but in practice, most
African governments require additional resources
from the international aid community to respond
to widespread food crisis. Reaching agreement over
food aid needs is not the only issue to be negotiated
between governments and donors. The targeting
and distribution of aid can also be highly
contentious. National governments are in most cases
reluctant to hand over to an external donor responsi-
bility for the geographical allocation of resources, or
for the identification of beneficiaries. Donors are
similarly reluctant to let go, for fear that 'their' aid
may be diverted for uses other than feeding the
victims of famine. They remain accountable to their
own sovereign institutions (Parliament, Congress
etc.). Better EW information, even if it provides data
relevant to targeting, can do little on its own to
address the fundamental conflict between national
sovereignty and ownership of internationally
donated relief resources.
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